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Abstract 
Self-esteem has not only been observed to be generally low in depression and anxiety, but 
also unstable.  Few studies have looked at unstable self-esteem in clinical samples.  The 
present study compared self-reported self-esteem instability across current depression (n = 
60), anxiety (n = 111), and comorbid depression/anxiety (n = 71), remitted depression (n = 
41), and anxiety (n = 29), recovered depression (n = 136) and anxiety (n = 98), and a never 
clinically depressed or anxious comparison group (n = 382).  The comparison group had 
more stable self-esteem than all groups.  Once controlling for overall levels of self-esteem, 
differences with current depression or anxiety, remitted depression, and recovered depression 
or anxiety remained, but disappeared for the comorbid group.  The current findings are 
consistent with the view that not only enduring low self-esteem per se, but also high self-
esteem reactivity may contribute to the aetiology of affective disorders.  
Keywords: self-esteem, instability, anxiety, depression, comorbid 
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Low global self-esteem (i.e., the degree that one values oneself irrespective of specific 
context) is a key variable in most explanatory and causal models of major depressive disorder 
(MDD) and anxiety disorders (AD; e.g., Beck, 2002).  Indeed, research has consistently 
found low levels of G-SE in clinical samples (van Tuijl et al., 2016).  Low global self-esteem 
appears to precede increases in symptomatology suggesting a potential causal role (Sowislo 
& Orth, 2013).  Many studies show that global self-esteem is mostly consistent over the life 
span, with slight increases observed from adolescence to young adulthood, and middle age, 
before starting to decrease in old age (Orth & Robins, 2014).  However, the extent of change 
in levels of self-esteem from moment-to-moment appears to vary between persons.  Self-
esteem instability refers to the extent and frequency of short-term self-esteem fluctuations 
usually in response to mood states (Clasen, Fisher, & Beevers, 2015) or positive and negative 
daily situations (Kernis, Grannemann, & Mathis, 1991).  This is in keeping with diathesis-
stress models that highlight individual differences in reactivity to external factors, or the 
intensity required to gain a reaction (Zuckerman, 1999). 
Regarding MDD and AD, some have argued that low levels of baseline self-esteem 
(i.e., low global self-esteem) are not a prominent aspect per se (e.g., Franck & De Raedt, 
2007), but rather the degree and frequency of fluctuations from this baseline level (i.e., high 
self-esteem instability).  Global self-esteem and self-esteem instability is thought to reflect 
trait and state self-esteem, respectively.  Prior studies looking at self-esteem instability have 
mainly been conducted using student samples, with a focus on depressive symptomatology.  
Some found that self-esteem instability was a better predictor of depressive symptoms than 
global self-esteem  (Roberts & Monroe, 1992), some found an interaction between self-
esteem instability and global self-esteem in predicting symptoms (de Man, Gutiérrez, & 
Sterk, 2001; Kernis et al., 1991; study 1, Roberts, Kassel, & Gotlib, 1995), while others failed 
to find the predictive validity of self-esteem instability over and above global self-esteem 
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(study 2 & 3, Roberts et al., 1995).  Given that the mean level of depressive symptoms in 
student samples are often very low, it is unclear whether these findings can be reliably 
translated to clinical samples of MDD or AD.   
Two studies have been conducted to date with clinical samples of MDD and AD.  
Unstable self-esteem was observed in social anxiety disorder, but was no longer significant 
when controlling for global self-esteem (Farmer & Kashdan, 2014).  This suggests that global 
self-esteem is key to differentiating between those with and without a social anxiety disorder.  
In another study, those with a current MDD reported less stable self-esteem than a never-
depressed comparison group.  Furthermore, levels of self-esteem stability in those with a 
history of depression and a current depression did not differ.  However, global self-esteem 
was not controlled for in this study.  Further analysis revealed that self-esteem instability was 
related to symptoms 6 months later in the never-depressed comparison group and former 
MDD, while global self-esteem and an interaction between the two were not (Franck & De 
Raedt, 2007).  Research conducted till now, both clinical and analogue, seem to support the 
hypothesis that self-esteem instability plays a role in MDD (symptoms).  Given the lack of 
relevant studies, the case for AD is weaker, and it is unclear as to whether MDD and AD may 
differ in level of self-esteem stability.  As comorbid MDD and AD have previously shown to 
have lower levels of global self-esteem than those with either an MDD or AD (van Tuijl et 
al., 2016), it is feasible that self-esteem stability may also be lower in the comorbid group 
which may explain the poorer rate of remittance (Penninx et al., 2011).  Therefore, the first 
aim of the present study was to compare levels of self-esteem stability between MDD, AD, 
co-morbid MDD and AD, and a never depressed or anxious comparison group. 
Many studies report a significant positive relationship between global self-esteem and 
self-esteem stability (Okada, 2010).  This is in keeping with the sociometer theory which 
postulates that individuals with high (trait) self-esteem are less likely to lower their self-
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esteem in response to rejection (state self-esteem), due to high expectations of being accepted 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000).  The second aim of the present study, therefore, was to compare 
self-esteem stability across clinical groups and a relatively healthy comparison group while 
correcting for global self-esteem.  Furthermore, to test the possibility that self-esteem 
instability is relevant only when global self-esteem is low, the interaction between global 
self-esteem and self-esteem stability in explaining symptoms of depression and anxiety is 
explored. 
High relapse and recurrence rates are fairly typical in MDD and AD.  This has fuelled 
several scarring hypotheses that argue that following periods of symptomatology, residual 
cognitions like low self-esteem remain that increases vulnerability for relapse (Lewinsohn, 
Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981).  Indeed, lower levels of global self-esteem were 
observed in remitted and recovered AD and MDD when compared to those who had never 
been diagnosed with a depressive or anxiety disorder (van Tuijl et al., 2016).  The notion that 
remaining scars lie dormant and can be activated by mild sad moods (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, 
& Kennedy, 2001; Segal, Gemar, & Williams, 1999), should mean that recovered and 
remitted MDD and AD are likely to report less stable self-esteem than a relatively healthy 
comparison group, even when controlling for global self-esteem.  Supporting this notion, 
former MDD showed lower self-esteem stability than a never-depressed comparison group, 
and similar levels as current MDD (Franck & De Raedt, 2007).  However, the former MDD 
group did not differentiate between those who were in remittance (i.e., recently experienced 
an episode) and those who were recovered.  It is feasible that scars continue to heal after an 
episode of MDD.  Further, no self-esteem instability studies have included clinical groups of 
remitted and recovered AD.  Therefore, the third goal of this study was to differentiate within 
the clinical groups (MDD, AD and comorbid) between those who currently met the criteria 
for the disorder, those who were currently in remission, and those who had recovered. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from community, primary care and mental health 
organisations into the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA; 
www.nesda.nl/) if they currently had a depressive disorder or AD (n = 1701), or if they were 
at risk of developing a disorder (e.g., a parent with a depression or AD) or had a life-time 
diagnosis (n = 907).  A further 373 participants with no history of a depressive or anxiety 
disorder were recruited as a relatively healthy comparison group.  Baseline measures took 
place in 2004-2007 (N = 2981), and have been followed up biannually.  At baseline, 
exclusion criteria were: a) Primary diagnosis of other psychiatric disorders such as psychotic 
disorder, an obsessive-compulsive disorder, a bipolar disorder, or a severe addiction; b) Non-
fluent command of the Dutch language (Penninx et al., 2008).  The present study makes use 
of data collected at the six-year follow-up when self-esteem measures were first included.  
There was a 24% attrition rate at this wave since baseline (N = 2256 remaining), and 1799 
received the self-esteem measures (age range 23 – 72, M = 48.05, SD = 13.18; 63.6% 
female).  A number of participants did not complete the self-esteem measures for various 
technical and practical reasons (n = 457; e.g., participation via telephone).   A further 83 
participants were excluded from the main analyses as they met the criteria for a bipolar 
disorder during the study, or reported an alcohol dependence since the last interview (final n 
= 1716). All participants provided written consent, and ethical approval was granted by all 
participating universities. 
Clinical groups were formed based on answers given on the Composite International 
Diagnostic Interview (v2.1; CIDI; Robins et al., 1988; Wittchen, 1994).  The CIDI is a semi-
structured interview conducted by trained staff to determine MDD, dysthymia, panic disorder 
7 
 
(with and without agoraphobia), generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety and agoraphobia 
based on the criterion outlined in the DSM-IV.  Information concerning disorder diagnosis 
and recency (when symptoms ceased) was used to form the different clinical groups (see van 
Tuijl et al., 2016).  In brief, MDD and AD clinical groups were split by those currently in an 
episode (diagnosis in past month), those in remission (an episode that had ended in the last 
six - one month), and those recovered (an episode in the last seven years – six months)1.  In 
order to establish relatively pure MDD, those who had also met the criteria for AD since the 
last interview were excluded (n = 162).  Likewise, participants who had a current AD and 
also met the criteria for any depressive disorder (e.g., MDD, dysthymia) since the last 
interview were excluded (n = 123).  Those in the recovered AD or MDD groups had no 
history of MDD (and dysthymia) or AD, respectively.  Current AD and MDD groups were 
also formed based on the same criteria as the MDD and AD groups.  It was not possible to 
create a recovered co-morbid group as it could not be determined whether previous MDD and 
AD occurred at the same time.  Furthermore, the number of participants with remitted 
comorbid MDD and AD was very low (n = 14) and were therefore excluded.  Participants 
with no history of AD, MDD or dysthymia formed the relatively healthy comparison group.  
The upper half of Table 1 provides an overview of the demographics and size of each group. 
Measures 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). The BAI is a 
self-report questionnaire containing 21 anxiety symptoms.  The degree of disturbance in the 
past week was answered on a 4-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Severely [I could 
barely stand it]).  Higher total scores were indicative of more anxious symptoms.  Missing 
answers were replaced with participant’s mean response (n = 47).  From the 1716 
participants, 30 participants were excluded from any analysis involving the BAI (26 failed to 
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return the questionnaire and four had more than nine missing answers).  Previous studies 
report excellent internal consistency in the BAI (e.g., Cronbach’s α = .92; Beck et al., 1988). 
Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – self-report (IDS; Rush et al., 1986).  
A self-report IDS was used to measure the severity of depressive symptoms in the last week, 
based on the DSM-IV criteria for MDD.  Twenty-eight items (e.g., “Feeling sad”) were 
answered with four options where “0” indicated no depression (e.g., “I do not feel sad”) and 
“3” referred to a severe depressive symptom (e.g., “I feel sad nearly all the time”).  Higher 
total scores were indicative of relatively severe depressive symptomatology.  From the 1799 
participants, 29 were excluded from any analysis involving the IDS (26 failed to return the 
questionnaire and three had too many missing answers [>6 items]).  Previous studies report 
excellent internal consistency in the IDS (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha = .94; Rush, Gullion, Basco, 
Jarrett, & Trivedi, 1996). 
 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1989).  A self-report questionnaire 
containing 10 items was used to measure global self-esteem.  Answers were given on a 4-
point Likert scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree).  Higher scores were 
indicative of higher global self-esteem.  Excellent internal reliability was observed in the 
present study (Cronbach’s α = .92). 
 Self-Esteem Stability. To measure self-esteem stability participants were asked to 
rate the following two questions: “How much I value myself is subject to changes” and “How 
much I value myself is stable across several situations at various times”.  Answers to both 
questions were answered on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (“completely does not apply to 
me”) to 5 (“completely applies to me”).  These questions were selected from a five-item 
measure originally developed by Raes and Van Gucht (2009)2.  Higher scores were indicative 
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of more stable self-esteem, based on total scores following the reversal of the answer to the 
first question.  Spearman-Brown correlation between the two items was .55. 
Procedure 
 NESDA assessments take between three and five hours, and are completed in one 
sitting (see Penninx et al., 2008).  Assessments contain computer tasks, self-report 
questionnaires, interviews, and biological measures carried out by trained staff.  Participants 
received travel expenses and a 15-euro gift certificate. 
Statistical Analysis 
 Bivariate correlations between self-esteem stability and global self-esteem, IDS, and 
BAI were calculated.  Other possible correlations have been reported previously (van Tuijl et 
al., 2016).  In the first part of the analysis, an ANOVA was conducted to compare self-esteem 
stability across groups (i.e., current/remitted/recovered MDD, current/remitted/recovered AD, 
current comorbidity and the comparison group).  This analysis was then repeated with global 
self-esteem as a covariate.  In the second part of the analysis, two multiple regression 
analyses were conducted to predict variance in IDS scores (n = 1680) and variance in BAI 
scores (n = 1665).  In both models, global self-esteem and self-esteem stability (both 
standardized) were entered at step 1.  At step 2, the interaction between standardized global 
self-esteem and self-esteem stability scores was entered.  Following a residual analysis, 
extreme residuals (±3.3) were removed before re-running the analysis to improve the fit of 
the model.  Two-way interactions were probed using a method outlined by Dawson (2014) 
and Aiken and West (1991), and slopes were tested at ± 1 SD of global self-esteem 
(www.jeremydawson.co.uk/slopes). 
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Results 
Descriptives 
 Mean age, BAI, IDS, global self-esteem, and self-esteem stability scores, and the 
percentage females, per group, are presented in Table 1.  Based on Spearman’s Rho, self-
esteem stability was significantly correlated with global self-esteem, ρ(1714) = .67, p<.001, 
IDS, ρ(1685) = -.51, p <.001, and BAI, ρ(1684) = -.44, p<.001.  In other words, relatively 
unstable self-esteem was associated with lower global self-esteem, and more depression and 
anxiety symptoms.  Previous missing data analysis highlighted that those who did not receive 
self-esteem measures (n = 457) did not differ in age, but did have higher BAI (d = 0.28) and 
IDS (d = 0.25) scores than completers (n = 1799; van Tuijl et al., 2016). 
 To explore differences in self-esteem stability between types of AD, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted.  Participants were excluded from this analysis if another AD was 
present in the previous six months (i.e., comorbidity within AD).  Groups were formed based 
on the current presence of a social anxiety disorder (n = 35), panic disorder (with or without 
agoraphobia; n = 21), agoraphobia (n = 26), and generalised anxiety disorder (n = 9).  Results 
indicated that there was no difference between AD types in self-esteem stability, F(3, 87) = 
1.31, p = .28, partial η2 = .04, thus supporting one current AD group incorporating all AD 
types. Conclusions were the same both when BAI scores and global self-esteem scores were 
statistically controlled for. 
Self-Esteem Stability across Groups 
Scores on the self-esteem stability were compared across groups with a one-way 
ANOVA.  The one-way ANOVA was significant, F(7,920) = 50.18, p <.001.  Levene’s test 
was significant (p = .04), and group sizes were unequal, thus Games-Howell post-hoc 
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ANOVA comparisons were conducted.  The relatively healthy comparison group had more 
stable self-esteem than all other clinical groups (d’s 1.04 – 1.60), including those who had 
recovered from MDD (d = 0.66, 95% CI [0.48, 0.99]) and AD (d = 0.78, 95% CI [0.60, 
1.11]).  Those who had recovered from MDD, and those who had recovered from AD, had 
more stable self-esteem than all other clinical groups (d’s 0.44 - 0.88) except for remitted AD 
(p = .58 & p = .87, respectively).  Recovered MDD and recovered AD did not differ from one 
another in degree of self-esteem instability (p = .999).  There were no further differences (p’s 
> .11). 
The one-way ANOVA was repeated with global self-esteem as a covariate, to see 
whether earlier differences between self-esteem stability remained when correcting for global 
self-esteem.  The model was significant F(8,918) = 106.33, p <.001, partial η2 = .48.  With 
global self-esteem as a significant covariate, F(1,919) = 361.72, p<.001, partial η2 = .28, there 
was a significant effect of group, F(7,919) = 6.79, p<.001, partial η2 = .05.  As Levene’s test 
was significant, F(7, 920) = 2.46, p = .02, and group sizes unequal, more conservative 
Bonferroni post-hoc ANCOVA comparisons were conducted (estimated marginal means 
reported in Table 1).  In correcting for differences in global self-esteem, the relatively healthy 
comparison group still had more stable self-esteem than current MDD (p=.01), remitted 
MDD (p<.001), current AD (p=.002), recovered MDD (p=.001) and recovered AD (p = .01).  
There were no further differences (p’s >.07). 
Interaction between Self-esteem Stability and Global Self-Esteem 
 To test whether self-esteem stability was higher in those who also had high global 
self-esteem, we conducted an independent t-test on self-esteem stability score in those with 
high/low global self-esteem as quantified by a median split on the complete sample. With a 
median split of 31.00 on global self-esteem, 911 scored 31 or above, and 805 scored below.  
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Those with higher global self-esteem (M = 7.58, SD = 1.70) reported more stable levels of 
self-esteem than those with lower global self-esteem (M = 5.33, SD = 1.45), t(1712.23) = 
29.62, d = 1.42 (equal variances not assumed). 
In predicting symptoms of depression, seven extreme residuals were removed before 
running the analysis.  With the inclusion of global self-esteem and self-esteem stability scores 
at step one, the model was significant, F(2, 1677) = 755.96, p<.001 and predicted 47% of 
variance in IDS scores (adjusted R = .47).  At this step, both global self-esteem (B = -6.93, 
SE = .25, p<.001, semi-partial r = -.49) and self-esteem stability (B = -0.62, SE = .25, p = .01, 
semi-partial r = -.04) were significant coefficients in the model.  With the inclusion of the 
interaction between self-esteem stability and global self-esteem, the model improved, F-
change (1, 1676) = 17.08, p<.001, and now explained 48% of variance in scores (adjusted R 
= .48; final model - F (3, 1676) = 514.50, p <.001).  Both global self-esteem (B = -6.79, SE = 
.25, p<.001, semi-partial r = -.48) and self-esteem stability scores (B = -0.78, SE = .25, p = 
.002, semi-partial r = -.06) remained significant coefficients.  Also, the interaction between 
global self-esteem and self-esteem stability was a significant factor in the model, B = 0.77, 
SE = .19, p<.001, semi-partial r = .07.  The interaction is plotted in Figure 1, and simple 
slopes analysis revealed that when global self-esteem was high (+1 SD), there was no 
difference in IDS score across low/high self-esteem stability, gradient of slope = -0.01, t = -
.04, p = .97.  However, when global self-esteem was low (-1 SD), the slope was significant, 
gradient of slope = -1.55, t = -4.63, p <.001, suggesting that those with more unstable self-
esteem reported higher IDS scores than those with relatively stable self-esteem. 
In predicting symptoms of anxiety, 21 extreme residuals were removed before 
rerunning the analysis. At step one, the model was significant, F(2, 1662) = 355.27, p<.001, 
and predicted 30% of variance in BAI scores (adjusted R = .30).  Both global self-esteem (B 
= -3.42, SE = .19, p<.001, semi-partial r = -.37) and self-esteem stability scores (B = -0.58, 
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SE = .19, p = .002, semi-partial r = -.06) were significant coefficients in this model.  With the 
inclusion of the interaction between self-esteem stability and global self-esteem, improved 
the model, F-change (1, 1661) = 4.59, p = .03, and still explained for 30% of variance in BAI 
scores (adjusted R = .30; final model - F(3, 1661) = 238.89, p<.001).  Both global self-
esteem, B = -3.67, SE = .19, p<.001, semi-partial r = -.36, and self-esteem stability scores, B 
= -0.64, SE = .19, p = .001, semi-partial r = -.07, remained significant coefficients in the 
model.  The interaction between global self-esteem and self-esteem stability was also 
significant, B = 0.30, SE = .14, p = .03, semi-partial r = .04, and is plotted in Figure 2.  
Simple slopes revealed that when global self-esteem was high (+1 SD), there was no 
difference in BAI score across low/high self-esteem stability (gradient of slope = -0.34, t = -
1.53, p = .13).  However, when global self-esteem was low (-1 SD), the slope was significant 
(gradient of slope = -0.95, t = -3.71, p <.001), suggesting that those with less stable self-
esteem reported higher BAI scores than those with more stable self-esteem. 
Discussion 
The main findings of the present study can be summed as follows: i) The comparison 
group without a history of MDD or AD reported more stable self-esteem than all current, 
remitted, and recovered clinical groups, whereas recovered AD and MDD reported more 
stable self-esteem than all other clinical groups; ii) For current MDD, current AD, remitted 
MDD, recovered MDD, and recovered AD, these differences in self-esteem stability with the 
comparison group remained when correcting for global self-esteem; iii)  Specifically when 
global self-esteem was low, symptoms of both depression and anxiety were related to self-
esteem instability. 
 Self-esteem stability was lower in all clinical groups in contrast to the comparison 
group.  This is in keeping with the previous studies who have observed unstable self-esteem 
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in current MDD and AD (Farmer & Kashdan, 2014; Franck & De Raedt, 2007), and is 
consistent with previous studies using analogue student samples (e.g., de Man et al., 2001).  
The current findings extend those of Franck and De Raedt (2007) by highlighting that even 
when correcting for global self-esteem, unstable self-esteem was still reported in current 
MDD, remitted MDD and recovered MDD.  Moreover, self-esteem instability was also 
observed in the current AD group in the present sample, even when correcting for global self-
esteem.  The latter is in contradiction with Farmer and Kashdam (2014) who found that the 
relevance of self-esteem instability in social anxiety disorder disappeared when taking global 
self-esteem into account.  It seems unlikely that the conflicting findings are explained by 
broader inclusion criteria for AD of the present study since individuals with social anxiety 
disorder did not differ in self-esteem stability from the other ADs.  However, in Farmer and 
Kashdam’s sample, 17.5% of the socially anxious individuals had a comorbid depression.  
Differences in self-esteem stability between those with and without a comorbid depression 
were not analysed.  As such, the presence of a comorbid MDD may account for the difference 
in findings. 
Differences in self-esteem stability between comorbid MDD/AD and the comparison 
group without a history of MDD or AD disappeared once controlling for global self-esteem, 
but remained for those with a relatively pure MDD or AD.  It is not entirely clear why 
unstable self-esteem was observed in purer forms of MDD or AD, but not in comorbid MDD 
or AD.  One explanation may lie in differences in global self-esteem.  In a previous study, 
comorbid MDD and AD was found to have lower global self-esteem than both those with 
MDD and those with AD, potentially because of more persistent and severe symptomatology 
(van Tuijl et al., 2016).  It is feasible that when global self-esteem is already extremely low, 
there is little room for fluctuations.  In other words, self-esteem cannot drop any lower.  
Likewise, those with relatively high global self-esteem, like those in the comparison group, 
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also have little room to fluctuate.  Therefore, the extent of instability might be similar 
between those with very high global self-esteem (i.e., comparison group) and those with very 
low global self-esteem (i.e., comorbid group).  The combination of very low and unstable 
self-esteem may partly explain the highly persistent nature of comorbidity which is often 
higher than relatively pure forms of MDD or AD (Penninx et al., 2011). 
The combination of low and stable self-esteem may also explain the treatment-
resistant nature of comorbidity (Penninx et al., 2011).  Some self-esteem flexibility was 
argued to be vital for a psychoeducational group treatment to be effective in reducing 
depressive symptoms, as those with less stable self-esteem pre-treatment showed more 
improvement (Roberts, Shapiro, & Gamble, 1999).  As such, the implication of the current 
findings suggest that a self-esteem intervention is especially necessary in comorbidity to not 
only increase global self-esteem that is especially low, but also to introduce some flexibility 
into self-evaluations which may make other treatments more effective.  Such an intervention 
may not be necessary for those with purer forms of MDD or AD, as common treatments such 
as cognitive behavioural therapy already appear to increase global self-esteem (Richardson, 
Stallard, & Velleman, 2010), although it is unclear whether self-esteem also becomes more 
stable.  As such, it seems to be vital to differentiate between comorbid MDD/AD and 
relatively pure disorders as comorbidity may be more than simply the sum of MDD and AD 
symptoms. 
 In the present study, differences in self-esteem stability were observed between the 
comparison group and remitted MDD, remitted AD, recovered MDD and recovered AD.  
These findings are in keeping with the unstable self-esteem observed in the former MDD 
group by Franck and De Raedt (2007).  However, as we did not exclude recovered and 
remitted MDD with residual symptoms, Franck and De Raedt’s findings are extended to 
highlight that low self-esteem stability is present in both remitted and recovered MDD, more 
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broadly.  The presence of unstable self-esteem in remittance and recovery could be explained 
in terms of a remaining vulnerable self-esteem scar from an episode which is reactive to 
stress and negative moods.  However, given the cross-sectional nature of the current study, it 
is just as feasible that this “scar” is a remaining prodromal factor that was present before the 
episode in question, or a preceding symptom of the next episode.  Future longitudinal 
research should look at whether unstable self-esteem following MDD and AD predicts 
relapse.  Furthermore, scars have been hypothesised to lie dormant until activated by life 
events or stressors (Segal et al., 1999).  Such stressors need not necessarily be major in order 
to (re-)activate the scars as self-esteem may fluctuate in response to subtle changes in mood 
and daily (minor) life events (Clasen et al., 2015; Kernis et al., 1991; Roberts & Monroe, 
1994).  As such, future longitudinal research should include a measure of (minor) stressors to 
see whether low self-esteem stability specifically in the presence of stressors predicts relapse. 
 Further support for the differential role of global self-esteem and self-esteem stability 
in MDD and AD comes from the regression analysis of symptoms across both the clinical 
groups and the comparison group.  For depressive and anxiety symptomatology, self-esteem 
instability explained variance over and above global self-esteem, although global self-esteem 
did explain more variance than self-esteem stability (for a further discussion of global self-
esteem in this sample see van Tuijl et al., 2016).  Consistent with the findings by De Man, 
Gutiérrez and Sterk (2001), particularly when global self-esteem was low, unstable self-
esteem was related to depressive and anxiety symptoms.  Previously, this has been taken to 
suggest that stable self-esteem is to some extent a protective factor when global self-esteem is 
low.  However, it is also feasible to argue that fluctuations when self-esteem is high are not 
problematic because this may all occur within a positive range.  It is also possible that 
fluctuations occur a lot less when global self-esteem is relatively high. This notion is in 
keeping with sociometer theory of self-esteem which suggest that those possessing high self-
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esteem are less likely to react to instances of rejection given that acceptance is anticipated 
(Leary & Baumeister, 2000).  Indeed, several studies have highlighted that self-esteem 
moderates responses to rejection (e.g., Ford & Collins, 2010).  In keeping with the findings in 
the current study, many have reported a positive correlation between global self-esteem and 
stable self-esteem, suggesting that those with higher self-esteem are less likely to report 
instability (Okada, 2010).  Indeed, in the present study, those scoring below the median split 
on global self-esteem reported more unstable self-esteem.  Therefore, it may be most fruitful 
to target global self-esteem in depression and anxiety interventions not only because it 
appears to be more strongly related to self-esteem stability, but also, as the findings suggest, 
instability when global self-esteem is high may not be detrimental. 
 Symptom severity is often reported to be higher in comorbid depression and anxiety 
(Penninx et al., 2011).  As such, there is some contradiction between the observed association 
between symptoms and self-esteem instability, and the lack of support that the comorbid 
group and the comparison group differ on the later.  As separate analyses were conducted for 
depression and anxiety symptoms, it is plausible that in the presence of both symptoms, self-
esteem instability explains no additional variance over and above global self-esteem.  This is 
in keeping with theories that comorbid depression and anxiety is more than a sum of the parts 
(Kleiman & Riskind, 2012).  The present findings only further justify accounting for the 
presence of comorbidity within clinical groups.  Future studies should adopt more complex 
models as there are several ways in which comorbidity may occur (e.g., depression occurring 
before anxiety or vice versa).  Furthermore, it might be pivotal to acknowledge more complex 
associations between symptoms and self-esteem, which may not be entirely linear.  It is 
feasible that unstable self-esteem is particularly relevant in distinguishing individuals at risk 
of developing depression or an anxiety disorder when global self-esteem levels are mid to 
low range, and not extremely low or high. 
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Limitations 
Most previous studies looking at self-esteem instability have quantified this construct 
based on the standard deviation of multiple self-report measures of global self-esteem.  This 
method may be less affected by self-report biases assuming that the influence would be 
similar for each measurement moment.  The method employed in the current study is more 
likely be subject to self-report biases, which would also affect measures of global self-esteem 
to a similar degree (e.g., social desirability bias would presumably affect two measures 
concerning the self to an equal extent), and also assumes that perceived and actual self-
esteem stability are adequately linked.  However, even when controlling for differences in 
global self-esteem, differences in self-esteem stability were still observed, suggesting the 
measure of self-esteem stability tapped into something else.  Furthermore, quantifying self-
esteem stability as is done in the present study improves comparability across studies.  Given 
that previous studies have varied in how often they provided multiple measures of global self-
esteem (e.g., from weekly to daily), it is unclear what influence this may have had on the 
scores.  Finally, it is not clear how standard deviations based on skewed scores should be 
dealt with (e.g., participants who often score high, or low), or extreme outliers (e.g., a rare 
good or bad day), both of which influence the self-esteem score derived (Baird, Le, & Lucas, 
2006). 
It should be noted that the two items of the self-esteem stability scale did not show the 
high internal-reliability which is often observed in other self-report measures.  This may be 
explained by the fact that one item is reversed, and previous studies suggest that reverse items 
reduce scale uni-dimensionality (e.g., Herche & Engelland, 1996).  While the measure of 
self-esteem stability did show additional explained variance over and above the measure of 
global self-esteem, the two were also highly correlated.  Future studies may seek to include 
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more items in the measure to capture the construct of self-esteem (in)stability, and increase 
the internal reliability. 
Conclusions 
 The present study underlines the role of perceived self-esteem instability in clinical 
groups of MDD and AD.  The current findings are consistent with the view that not only 
enduring low self-esteem per se, but also low self-esteem stability may contribute to the 
development or maintenance of affective disorders.  This seems particularly true when global 
self-esteem is low as well.  Furthermore, such instability appears to persist into remittance 
and recovery which may contribute to the increased risk of relapse.  From a clinical 
perspective, these findings highlight that a more stable level of self-esteem is desirable.  If 
this is not the case, then a minor perceived rejection may undo any intervention effects.  
However, given that global self-esteem appears to be more strongly related to symptoms of 
depression and anxiety than self-esteem instability, and fluctuations when self-esteem is high 
does not appear detrimental in comparison to when self-esteem is low, targeting global self-
esteem may be a more efficient intervention. 
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Footnotes 
1 We used these cut-offs as these were more readily available within the study.  It should be noted that 
what defines, for example, a depression in remission varies across studies.  Frank et al. (1991) 
recommends that remission be considered as a depression-free period of 2-6 months, with longer than 
6 months considered a recovery.  Our cut-offs are not too far from this.  Cut-offs for ADs are 
dependent on the type of AD; however we apply the same cut-offs as used for MDD for consistency 
when comparing the groups and creating comorbid groups. 
2 In the interest of keeping NESDA measurements as concise as possible, two items were selected 
based on face validity that they related to the conceptual understanding of self-esteem stability, and 
were not completely overlapping.  As such, a positively phrased item  and a  negatively phrased item 
were selected.  Excluded items were “The extent to which I value myself may vary at different times”, 
“A certain event can make me value myself more, or less than how much I valued myself before the 
event”, and “I often switch between ‘feeling extremely positive about myself’ and ‘seeing only the 
bad things about myself, and feeling like a failure’”. 
 
